



Abuse of INTERPOL Red Notices

The Cases of Russia and China

INTERPOL



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I. INTRODUCTION

Dear delegates of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),

During this debate, you will discuss the current topic: **Abuse of INTERPOL Red Notices - The cases of Russia and China.**

Abuse of INTERPOL Red Notices by member States has seen an increase in recent years. Delegations wrongfully file these notices against political adversaries, journalists and media figures, human rights activists, and several other characters for reasons that do not align with the original purpose and intent for Red Notices. This misuse violates several international laws and INTERPOL policies, undermines INTERPOL's authority and generally obstructs the optimal functioning of Red Notices and the International Police.



INTERPOL is deeply concerned about this topic and expects great results from this debate, whose objective is to find solutions to this problem.

Welcome to the Olinca Model United Nations (OLINMUN) 2026.

Yours sincerely,

Javier Valero de Robina

Head of Committee of INTERPOL

Gabriel Fournier Pasquel

Chair of INTERPOL

Lorena Marín Trujano

Moderator of INTERPOL

Nicolás Hernández Chávez


Deputy Chair of INTERPOL

NOTE: We highly recommend you thoroughly read the following document and the Delegate Handbook. We expect they will provide an overview of the topics discussed and allow you to acquire crucial information about the rules of procedure.

II. OVERVIEW

A. COMMITTEE'S BACKGROUND

The International Criminal Police Organization, better known as INTERPOL, is an intergovernmental organization formed by 195 member countries. Its objective is to help police in all of those countries to work together in order to make the world a safer place. To do this, INTERPOL enables member nations to share and access data on criminals and crimes, and it offers a range of technical and operational support.



Run by its Secretary General, it is staffed by both police and civilians and has its headquarters in Lyon, France, a global complex for innovation in Singapore and several satellite offices in different regions. Also, it connects all its countries via a communications system called I-24/7, which allows them to mutually communicate and access the databases and services in real time. The kind of investigative support provided consists of forensics, analysis, and assistance in locating fugitives around the world.

B. COMMITTEE'S ACHIEVEMENTS

In today's world, INTERPOL plays a crucial role in facilitating cooperation among police forces across the globe. All the information collected allows member countries to find any

fugitive anywhere in the world at any time. INTERPOL also works with governments, always maintaining a neutral position to ensure a proper and controlled environment. Since its founding in 1923, there have been many successful operations, but the most famous and important ones have been the following:

1. Jonathan Tokeley-Parry: He was one of the best-known smugglers in history, having stolen and smuggled more than 3,000 pieces of Egyptian antiques. Together with Scotland Yard and the Egyptian Antiquities Police, Interpol arrested him.
2. Philippe Jamin and Youssef Khimoun: In 1985, they managed to steal Monet's painting, 'Impression, Sunrise', from a Paris Museum. Interpol tracked them down in Japan, where they were linked to other crimes such as bank heists and stealing fur coats. After 5 years, Interpol managed to recover the painting in 1990.
3. Amado Carrillo Fuentes ('El señor de los cielos'): He was one of Mexico's most dangerous and powerful drug lords before he escaped from Mexico's Interpol agents and fled. Interpol put so much pressure on capturing him that in desperation, he allegedly tried to change his appearance in a 9-hour plastic surgery which he did not survive.

III. ABUSE OF INTERPOL RED NOTICES: THE CASES OF RUSSIA AND CHINA

INTERPOL, as the largest international police organization, is designed to ease cooperation among member states to combat transnational crime and promote global security. The Red Notice, one of the organization's key instruments, functions as a request for law enforcement across the world to locate and detain fugitives wanted for prosecution or to serve a sentence. The system is managed by INTERPOL'S Constitution,

which under Article 3, forbids the use of an intervention based on political, military, religious or racial character.

However, concerns have emerged about the political misuse of this mechanism by certain member states. This abuse involves delegations misusing these notices against individuals who do not align with the delegation's agenda. The primary targets include political adversaries, journalists, activists and dissidents. This misuse violates several international laws and INTERPOL policies, undermines INTERPOL's authority, and inhibits the functioning of Red Notices and the International Police. Red Notice requests must follow the specific conditions outlined in INTERPOL's Constitution and Rules, yet each request relies on an arrest warrant issued by the national authorities of the requesting country.

The operational challenge for INTERPOL lies in the difficulty of reliably distinguishing real criminal cases from politically motivated ones. Although all requests are reviewed by specialists in the Notices and Diffusions Task Force (NDTF). This situation has been highlighted in reports by international bodies such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the OSCE, and various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

The committee focuses on the cases of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, nations that have demonstrated the systematic use of Red Notices as a tool of transnational repression. The Russian Federation, for instance, has repeatedly issued Red Notices against government critics and opposition figures, often hiding political motives under broadly defined criminal charges. Furthermore, Russia has been documented attempting to re-file notices that were previously rejected by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) in an effort to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms. Similarly, documented patterns from the People's Republic of China have

been observed, targeting minority activists, political opponents, and individuals linked to separatist or religious movements.

To address this problem and preserve INTERPOL's integrity, it is imperative that the Organization and its member states implement concrete reforms. The path forward requires strengthening cooperation and establishing stricter verification procedures and a more rigorous quality control system in data handling. Ensuring greater transparency in the application and review process is essential. Furthermore, the possibility of imposing sanctions or restrictions on those states with repeated and proven cases of misuse must be seriously examined to ensure that accountability is a highly relevant part of the system. Addressing systemic abuse by states such as Russia and China is vital to preserving the integrity of international law enforcement, protecting fundamental human rights, and the proper functioning of INTERPOL's operation.



IV. KEY POINTS FOR DEBATE

1. Patterns of abuse
 - a. Politically motivated charges filed against opposition figures, activists, journalists, and dissidents.
 - b. Targeting of refugees or asylum seekers despite protections under international law.
2. Operational challenges for INTERPOL
 - a. High volume of requests resulting in committee overflow and incomplete processing of Red Notices, including legitimate requests.
 - b. Difficulty distinguishing political cases from criminal cases submitted by member states.
3. Legal considerations

- a. Compliance with Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution, states that it is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character.
- b. Alignment with international human rights norms, other UN programs and established ideals of the United Nations.

4. Oversight and review mechanisms
 - a. Role of CCF in evaluating and removing problematic notices.
 - b. Limitations, non-public decisions, and restricted investigative power by CCF.
5. Reform efforts and proposals
 - a. Considering penalties or restrictions for states with repeated cases of misuse.
 - b. Strengthening pre-screening to detect requests that have other motivations.
6. Case study: Russian Federation and People's Republic of China
 - a. Use of Red Notices against minority activists, political critics, political opponents, individuals involved in business disputes and individuals linked to dissident movements.
 - b. Attempts to resubmit previously rejected by INTERPOL's review mechanisms.

IV. ANNEXES

A. LIST OF COUNTRIES

1. Australia
2. Azerbaijan
3. Belarus
4. Canada
5. China
6. Egypt
7. France

8. Germany
9. India
10. Iran
11. Kazakhstan
12. Mexico
13. Netherlands
14. Pakistan
15. Qatar
16. Russian Federation
17. Sweden
18. Syria
19. Tajikistan
20. Türkiye
21. United Arab Emirates
22. United Kingdom
23. United States of America
24. Venezuela



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